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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103 (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its equitable division of the 
marital estate when it denied Mr. Poll a share of certain real property located in Wasatch 
County, Utah ("Wasatch Property") based on a specific factual finding that the Wasatch 
Property was Ms. Straub's separate property and that the parties intended it to remain Ms. 
Straub's separate property, and finding that Mr. Poll sought equitable relief with unclean 
hands? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue as framed by Mr. Poll is a mixed question 
because he implicitly asks this court to reverse the trial court's factual finding and to 
reverse the trial court's equitable division of the marital estate. This presents a mixed 
question of fact (whether the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub never intended to make 
a gift of a one-half interest in the Wasatch Property was clearly erroneous), and a 
question reviewed for an abuse of discretion (whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in its equitable division of the marital estate). 
First, Mr. Poll mounts a full frontal assault on a factual finding the trial court made 
after hearing live testimony and considering all the evidence. Because Mr. Poll 
challenges factual findings, he is required to marshal the evidence in support of the 
challenged finding, and then demonstrate that the evidence on which the trial court relied 
is legally insufficient to support the finding. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 20, 
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FN 5, 217 P.3d 733. To meet this burden, Mr. Poll must first assemble, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every competent scrap of evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. Id. at^[21 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991)). Mr. Poll must then demonstrate some "fatal flaw" in the 
supportive evidence, and explain why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding. Id. at *p0, FN 5. Unless such a fatal flaw is identified, the finding will stand, 
even if there is ample evidence in the record that would have supported a contrary 
finding. Id. Accordingly, the starting point for this Court's analysis is a heavy 
presumption in favor of the challenged findings. Id. The trial court's finding can only be 
reversed if it is clearly erroneous. E.g., Ottens v. McNeil 2010 UT App 237, f 20, 239 
P.3d308. 
Second, Mr. Poll asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in its equitable 
division of the marital estate. "A trial court has considerable discretion concerning 
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of 
validity." Kimball 2009 UT App at f^ 13. The trial court's division of the marital estate is 
reviewed under the stringent abuse of discretion standard. Id. Such an abuse of 
discretion is to be found only where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in serious or substantial error, where the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the court's decision, or where such a serious inequity results as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For reference purposes, Ms. Straub refers to the following portions of the record 
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on appeal using the associated abbreviations: 
• Trial transcript, May 12, 2010: TR. 1. 
• Trial transcript, May 13, 2010: TR. 2. 
• Hearing transcript, May 18,2010: TR. 3. 
• The court file: R. 
Mr. Poll's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts adequately demonstrates 
that there is competent evidence, free from any fatal flaw, supporting the finding 
presently challenged. 
Specifically, the following facts presented in Mr. Poll's Statement of the Case 
provide this Court a more than adequate basis to affirm the court below: 
• James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust Account 
[which was undisputedly Ms. Straub's separate pre-marital funds], or Ms. Straub's 
personal account. The only way he could receive funds from those was to ask Ms. 
Straub to withdraw them and give them to him. TR. 1 at 80:11-81:7. In contrast, 
the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their names on it and 
had signing authority on it. TR. 1 at 84:6-19. 
• All $2.3 million used to purchase the Wasatch Property came from the Trust 
Account. TR. 1 at 43:11-22, 91:24-93:22. 
• Ms. Straub testified that James' name was included on the deed because "[w]e 
were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." TR. 
1 at 44:11-12. She denied intending to make a gift to James of one half of the 
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property. Id. at 44:13-15. 
• On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch Property to Sandra 
Poll. TR. 1 at 46:3-11, 98:13-99:2; R. 324, Exhibit 4. The sole reason James gave 
for divesting himself of the property was to prevent potential creditors from being 
able to execute against the property. TR. 1 at 46:20-47:4, 99:21-100:7. 
• Ms. Straub testified that the reason she did not ask James to deed the property 
back to her earlier was because she was afraid of him, and because he had become 
'physical55 on prior occasions. TR. 1 at 47:5-12. 
• A mere 8 months after taking title as a joint tenant, James, of his own volition, 
deeded the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub to protect it from potential 
creditors. TR. 1 at 163:21-166:8. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Poll challenges a factual finding made by the district court after a bench trial. 
Appellate courts grant significant deference to the trial court's findings of fact in this 
posture. Mr. Poll must first marshal the evidence, and if there is evidence to support the 
finding, he must demonstrate a fatal legal flaw in the nexus between the evidence and the 
finding. If the finding is to be reversed, there must be a fatal flaw. Stated in the form of 
a contrapositive, if there is no fatal flaw in the nexus between evidence and finding, the 
finding must stand. Mr. Poll has not claimed that any such fatal legal flaw exists. His 
sole contention is that the evidence does not support the finding. Because there is 
substantial competent evidence to support the finding, the finding must stand. 
The gravamen of Mr. Poll's arguments presented in his brief merely re-hash 
arguments that have already been presented to, and rejected by, the district court. In the 
absence of a showing that a finding was clearly erroneous, or a showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion in its equitable division of the marital estate, this Court should 
not undertake to second-guess the trial court because the trial court is in an advantaged 
position to see the witnesses, judge their credibility and weigh the equities. Importantly, 
after hearing both parties testify the trial court found Ms. Straub's testimony credible and 
Mr. Poll's testimony to lack credibility. Mr. Poll has not presented adequate grounds for 
this Court to second-guess the trial court's findings on this central point. 
Finally, Mr. Poll misapprehends the import of the trial court's application of 
unclean hands. The trial court did not conclude that Mr. Poll's conveying his interest in 
the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub met the statutory elements of a fraudulent 
transfer. Rather, the trial court, reasoning that the transfer might constitute a fraudulent 
transfer, and relying on Mr. Poll's improper purpose in effecting the conveyance, found 
that he came before a court of equity with unclean hands. The trial court was within the 
bounds of its discretion when it relied on the doctrine of unclean hands in denying Mr. 
Poll's claim to the Wasatch Property. 
ARGUMENT 
The real bone of contention in this appeal is the trial court's finding that Ms. 
Straub never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch Property to Mr. Poll. This finding 
was made after a bench trial where the trial court had a front row seat to an archetypal he-
said she-said dispute between divorcing spouses. The pivotal issue in this particular he-
said she-said battle: Ms. Straub's intent at the time she purchased the Wasatch Property. 
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After seeing both husband and wife testify en vivo, and considering all the other 
evidence, the trial court made one key finding: that Ms. Straub never intended to make a 
gift of the Wasatch Property to Mr. Poll. R. 338-36, fflf 20-29. Central to the trial court's 
finding was the finding that Mr. Poll's testimony was not credible and that Ms. Straub's 
testimony was credible. Id. at 336, \ 27. Mr. Poll now asks this court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses this court has not seen 
testify, nor will it ever have opportunity to do so. Particularly where the trial court 
identified other evidence that corroborated its finding on the issue of intent, Mr. Poll's 
challenge to this factual finding must fail. Id. at 338-36, ffi[ 20-29. 
Mr. Poll's primary challenge is to the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub never 
intended to make the Wasatch Property part of the marital estate and that she intended to 
keep it as her separate property. Before considering whether the trial court's finding was 
clearly erroneous, it is important to understand why this finding of intent matters. 
Mr. Poll claims that at the time the Wasatch Property was purchased, Ms. Straub's 
intent was to make a gift to him of an undivided interest in the whole property. If an 
interest in the Wasatch Property was gifted to Mr. Poll, it would have lost its separate 
character and he might still have an equitable interest in the property, despite the 
undisputed fact that he conveyed all legal title to it back to Ms. Straub a mere 7 months 
later. 
Litigants seeking to establish a gift must establish three elements: 1) a clear, 
unmistakable intention on the donor's part to pass immediate ownership, 2) irrevocable 
delivery, and 3) acceptance. Ross'Estate v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981). The 
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element in controversy here is the intent to pass immediate ownership. Indeed, Mr. Poll 
concedes this: "More importantly, which of the two parties paid the bills during the 
marriage is not a relevant consideration in determining whether Ms. Straub had the intent, 
at the time, to contribute the Wasatch Property to the marital estate. This is the 
controlling question " Brief of Appellant at 44. The parties are in agreement that the 
keystone question to this appeal is this: Was the trial court's finding that Ms. Straub did 
not intend to gift an undivided one-half interest in the whole Wasatch Property to Mr. 
Poll clearly erroneous? The trial court made detailed findings that she did not intend to 
make a gift of the Wasatch Property, and identified the evidence it relied on in so finding. 
R. 337-34, fflf 25-35. Mr. Poll assails this finding. 
1. THERE IS NO "FATAL FLAW" IN THE EVIDENCE THE DISTRICT 
COURT RELIED ON WHEN IT FOUND THAT MS. STRAUB DID NOT 
INTEND TO GIFT THE WASATCH PROPERTY INTO THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
Initially, Ms. Straub notes that Mr. Poll may not have adequately marshaled the 
evidence that supports the finding. Indeed, in an appeal arising out of a bench trial where 
the district court relies on live testimony in making its findings, marshalling may prove to 
be a near practical impossibility because the district court has within its perception 
factors that do not translate well into the record. Factors such as witness demeanor, body 
language or other non-verbal cues that can influence a trial court's findings of credibility 
and veracity are difficult, if not nearly impossible, to incorporate into the record. These 
factors put the trial court in a uniquely advantaged position to judge the credibility of 
witnesses. This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged this. See Hone v. 
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Hone, 2004 UT App 241, Tf 5, 95 P.3d 1221 (citing Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, \ 2, 20 
P.3d 332). Accordingly, this Court must give proper deference to the trial court's 
assessment of credibility of the witnesses because this Court has no opportunity to see the 
live testimony. Id. 
However, even if Mr. Poll has met his marshaling burden, what is clear from the 
portions of the record that Mr. Poll has assembled is that there is no fatal flaw in the 
evidence supporting the finding. When one considers the evidence and the finding Mr. 
Poll assails, it becomes apparent that this appeal amounts to little more than re-asserting 
Mr. Poll's trial testimony, which the trial court found lacked credibility, and presenting 
anew the same arguments the district court found unpersuasive. 
a. The Standard of Review Requires that if Competent Evidence 
Supports the Challenged Finding, The Finding Must Stand. 
This Court has recently provided guidance on what the marshaling requirement 
requires and what must be shown to satisfy the standard of review on a challenge to 
factual findings. Kimball, 2009 UT App at f20, FN 5. To reverse the trial court's 
finding, Mr. Poll must first satisfy the marshaling requirement and then show a fatal flaw 
in the evidence supporting the finding. Id. The finding can only be reversed if there is a 
fatal flaw. This is an exceptionally onerous burden. 
To state the standard of review in the form of a contrapositive, if there is no fatal 
flaw, the finding must stand. Stated yet another way, if there is competent evidence 
supportive of the finding, the finding must stand. This iteration of the burden of proof is 
conceptually easier to apply in the present case because Mr. Poll's sole challenge is that 
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the evidence does not support the finding. In this case, if competent evidence supports 
the finding, the trial court must be affirmed. This is true because Mr. Poll has not 
asserted any other legal error in the nexus between the evidence and the challenged 
finding. His sole challenge on appeal is that the evidence does not support the finding. 
Again, this is an incredibly onerous burden to satisfy, and a burden that Mr. Poll cannot 
meet on this record. 
With this standard in mind, it is appropriate to start with a heavy presumption in 
favor of the trial court's finding. See id. at f^ 13 (citing Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, 
Tf 6, 203 P.3d 1020). "After all, it is the trial court's singularly important mission to 
consider and weigh all the conflicting evidence and find the facts. No matter what 
contrary facts might have been found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial 
court's pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires us to take the findings of fact as our 
starting point, unless particular findings have been shown, in the course of an appellant's 
meeting the marshaling requirement, to lack legally adequate evidentiary support." Id. at 
120, FN 5. 
b. Competent Evidence Supports The Finding. 
Because there is evidence supporting the finding, this Court can only reverse the 
trial court if Mr. Poll has demonstrated a "fatal flaw" in the nexus connecting the 
evidence and the finding. Kimball, 2009 UT App at 120, FN 5. Such a "fatal flaw" 
exists only where the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Id. 
"Examples of such legal insufficiency include that testimony was later stricken by the 
court; that a document was used for impeachment only and had not been admitted as 
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substantive evidence; that a document was not properly admitted because it did not 
qualify under the business record exception to the hearsay rule; and that testimony that 
seems to support a finding was recanted on cross-examination." Id. 
While it is apparent that this list of examples is not an exhaustive itemization of 
the fatal flaws that might arise, it is apparent that the type of flaw contemplated speaks to 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding. Id. If the evidence is 
substantive in nature, legally relevant to the finding and supportive thereof, and properly 
admitted into evidence, and not susceptible to some other legal flaw, the finding must 
stand. Id. ("The pill that is hard for many appellants to swallow is that if there is 
evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal problem - a "fatal flaw" - with that 
evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample evidence in the record that 
might have supported contrary findings."). 
Mr. Poll's Statement of Facts in his brief contains all the evidence this court needs 
to uphold the trial court under the present standard of review. The following facts, as 
stated in Mr. Poll's brief, support this finding: 
• James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust Account 
[which was undisputedly Ms. Straub's separate pre-marital funds], or Ms. Straub's 
personal account. The only way he could receive funds from those was to ask Ms. 
Straub to withdraw them and give them to him. TR. 1 at 80:11-81:7. In contrast, 
the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their names on it and 
had signing authority on it. TR. 1 at 84:6-19. 
• All $2.3 million used to purchase the Wasatch Property came from the Trust 
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Account. TR.1 at 43:11-22, 91:24-93:22. 
• Ms. Straub testified that James' name was included on the deed because "[w]e 
were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about it at the time." TR. 
1 at 44:11-12. She denied intending to make a gift to James of one half of the 
property. Id. at 44:13-15. 
• On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch Property to Ms. Straub. 
TR. 1 at 46:3-11, 98:13-99:2; R. 324, Exhibit 4. The sole reason James gave for 
divesting himself of the property was to prevent potential creditors from being 
able to execute against the property. TR. 1 at 46:20-47:4, 99:21-100:7. 
• Ms. Straub testified that the reason she did not ask James to deed the property 
back to her earlier was because she was afraid of him, and because he had become 
'physical" on prior occasions. TR. 1 at 47:5-12. 
• A mere 7 months after taking title as a joint tenant, James, of his own volition, 
deeded the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub to protect it from potential 
creditors. TR. 1 at 163:21-166:8. 
Moreover, after hearing live testimony, the trial court found Ms. Straub's 
testimony to be credible, and Mr. Poll's testimony to lack credibility on the critical issue 
of Ms. Straub's intent when the Wasatch Property was purchased. R. 337-336, fflf 24-29. 
This finding is particularly critical because James' live testimony and Ms. Straub's live 
testimony were in conflict on this point. After observing both witnesses and hearing 
what each had to say, the trial court found Ms. Straub credible and James not credible. 
Id. 
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There is no "fatal flaw" in the nexus between this evidence and the finding. All of 
the above-identified evidence was admitted into evidence without objection. All such 
evidence was substantive in nature, and not received for some other purpose. Moreover, 
none of the testimonial evidence was recanted on cross. Finally, Mr. Poll has not 
claimed that any other fatal flaw exists in the evidence supportive of the challenged 
finding. His argument on appeal, summarized succinctly, is that the evidence in the 
record would support a contrary finding. However, that such arguments must necessarily 
fail is precisely the hard-to-swallow pill to which the Kimball court referred. Kimball 
2009 UT App at 120, FN 5. 
Moreover, this evidence supports the trial court's finding that James came before 
the court with unclean hands in a similar manner to the litigants in Hone, 2004 UT App 
241.1 The trial court's finding that James' purpose in deeding the property back to Ms. 
Straub was improper was properly based on the evidence before it. Likewise, denying 
James also argues that the trial court found his deeding the property back to Ms. Straub 
was a fraudulent transfer. James misapprehends the nature of the trial court's reasoning. 
This point is taken up in more detail in Point 3. below. 
2
 Though Mr. Poll has not formally challenged the finding of unclean hands, his argument 
against the trial court's analysis relying on the concept of a fraudulent conveyance relies, 
in part, on a challenge to whether the trial court should have found that his motives were 
improper. This is another challenge to a factual finding, which would require marshaling 
the evidence. Mr. Poll has neither raised the issue, marshaled the evidence in favor of the 
finding, nor adequately briefed this Court on the claimed fatal flaw in the supporting 
evidence. For this reason, and because there is record evidence to support the finding, 
this Court should assume that the finding is correct. E.g., Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. 
Comtrol Inc.,2001 UT App 407, ffif 41-43, 175 P.3d 572, 580-81. Furthermore, the 
record adequately demonstrates that such a finding was proper based on the evidence 
before the trial court, as discussed in Point 3.a. below. 
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equitable relief to a party found to have come before a court of equity with unclean hands 
is well within the trial court's broad discretion.3 Hone, 2004 UT App at 111. 
It is abundantly clear then, that competent evidence supports the finding. The 
district court must be affirmed, unless Mr. Poll can demonstrate some other "fatal flaw55 
in this evidence that demonstrates to this Court that the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. Mr. Poll has made no contention of any other flaw. This should not be 
surprising, inasmuch as none exists. The trial court's finding must therefore be affirmed. 
Finally, Ms. Straub notes that the Supreme Court has previously approached a 
strikingly similar fact pattern in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
There, Husband claimed a one-half interest in real property he claimed to be marital. Id. 
Husband claimed the property became marital property because the home was held in 
joint tenancy, evidencing an intent to make a gift of a one-half interest therein. Id. The 
The question of whether the district court's application of the doctrine of unclean hands 
to Mr. Poll was an abuse of discretion has not been properly raised or briefed, and this 
Court need not address it. It is, however, apparent from the record that the application of 
the doctrine of unclean hands here closely parallels its application in Hone, where this 
Court found no abuse of discretion. 
4
 Also noteworthy is that Mr. Poll asks this court to find that Ms. Straub intended to make 
a gift of the Wasatch Property. Brief of Appellant at 47. Mr. Poll bore the burden of 
proving this fact by clear and convincing evidence to the trial court. Ross' Estate v. Ross, 
626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1981). It appears that appellate courts of this state have not 
answered the question of whether an appellant requesting an appellate court to make its 
own findings on factual issues that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence 
below face an even more onerous burden than appellants challenging facts proven by a 
preponderance below. Though this issue has not been raised directly in this appeal, it has 
been raised tacitly. To the extent that this issue may be helpful to this Court, Ms. Straub 
respectfully submits that because Mr. Poll seeks to establish a fact at the appellate level 
by clear and convincing evidence, he necessarily faces an even more stringent burden 
than an appellant challenging a fact proven by a preponderance below. 
13 
trial court found that there was no intent to make a gift of the home, and relying on this 
finding, denied Husband an equitable share of the home. Id. This finding was upheld on 
appeal because nothing in the record showed an abuse of discretion. Id. 
2. MR. POLL MERELY RE-HASHES ARGUMENTS PROPERLY 
REJECTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The gravamen of Mr. Poll's arguments to the district court in favor of his factual 
theory was that the Wasatch Property was gifted to him, converting the property to 
marital property, which was undisputedly purchased with Ms. Straub's separate funds. 
TR. at 198:1 - 201:2; R. at 300-299. As he argued before the trial court (R. at 300-299), 
Mr. Poll argues again to this Court that Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 
1988) requires that the trial court must be reversed. However, on closer inspection, 
Mortensen requires affirming the trial court, not reversing it. The Mortensen court stated 
that separate property becomes marital property "when the acquiring spouse places title 
in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property" 
or "has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Id. at 308. The critical 
inquiry is Ms. Straub's intent, as Mr. Poll recognizes. Brief of Appellant at 29. Further, 
as Mr. Poll points out, this Court has previously stated that transferring otherwise 
separate property into a joint tenancy, "when coupled with an evident intend to do so, 
effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Bradford v. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373,122, 993 P.2d 887 (emphasis added). 
Neither Mortensen nor Bradford is helpful to Mr. Poll. This is because both 
decisions focus on the intent of the donor at the time the property is acquired, or the gift 
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is allegedly made. Here, the trial court made a specific finding that Ms. Straub had no 
such donative intent. R. 337-336, fflf 24-29. These findings took the court outside the 
holding of Mortensen and Bradford because the requisite intent is not present here. The 
trial court should therefore be affirmed. 
Moreover, a review of the transcript of the trial and Mr. Poll's Trial Memorandum 
discloses that he has already argued this factual theory to the trial court. TR. at 198:1 — 
201:2; R. at 300-299. The trial court disagreed and made contrary findings based on a 
specifically articulated evidentiary basis. R. 337-336, fflf 24-28. This Court has 
previously rejected attempts to reargue evidence presented to the trial court that ignore 
factual support for the trial court's decision. See, e.g. Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, 
H 10, 76 P.3d 716; Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236,118, 9 P.3d 171. For similar 
reasons, this Court should reject Mr. Poll's attempt to do the same thing. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS. 
Because the trial court must be affirmed as explained above, this Court need not 
reach the issue of the trial court's application of unclean hands. Nevertheless, in the 
event that it is helpful to the Court, Ms. Straub explains here how the trial court was 
within the bounds of its permissible discretion with its application of the doctrine of 
unclean hands to the facts of this case. 
a. Mr. Poll Misapprehends The Trial Court's Reliance on His Intent In 
Conveying His Legal Interest to the Wasatch Property. 
Mr. Poll misapprehends the nature of the trial court's reliance on the concept of a 
fraudulent conveyance. Mr. Poll's argument is that the statutory elements of a fraudulent 
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transfer have not been met in this case, and that the trial court therefore erred by finding 
that a fraudulent transfer had taken place. The trouble with this analysis is that the trial 
court never concluded a fraudulent transfer occurred. Indeed, the express language of the 
trial court focused exclusively on Mr. Poll's intent, and made no mention of the other 
statutory elements of a fraudulent transfer: "The court finds that it would not be 
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially 
fraudulent conveyance." R. 336,129. 
The trial court's analysis proceeded thus: It is beyond dispute that Mr. Poll 
conveyed all legal interest he might have had in the property to Ms. Straub. He therefore 
has no legal claim to the Wasatch Property. His only claim to it would be an equitable 
claim. Mr. Poll argued that Ms. Straub intended to make a gift of the Wasatch Property 
by giving him an undivided interest in the whole as a joint tenant with rights of 
survivorship. Mr. Poll's assertion of an equitable interest in the Wasatch Property rests 
entirely on two facts: 1) his claim that the parties intended that an undivided interest in 
the whole of the Wasatch Property to be a gift to him;5 and 2) his claim that the real 
purpose behind his transferring the Wasatch Property back to Ms. Straub was to shield it 
from creditors, and not to disclaim any interest in it he might have. 
The trial court found these claims to lack credibility. R. at 337-335, fflf 24-34. 
5
 It is also important to note that the elements of gift must also be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. Ross' Estate, 626 P.2d at 491. This also has the effect of 
increasing the already heavy burden Mr. Poll faces in his request that this Court reverse 
the trial court's factual findings and application of the doctrine of unclean hands, and 
instruct the trial court to enter factual findings found by clear and convincing evidence by 
a reviewing court. 
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The trial court found that Ms. Straub never intended to make a gift of the property, but 
that the parties intended it to remain her separate property. Id. at 338, ^  27. The trial 
court then found that Mr. Poll's purpose behind transferring the property back to Ms. 
Straub was an improper one. Id. at 336,129. The court found that "it would not be 
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially 
fraudulent conveyance... The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not include 
the Wasatch County property and that it would be the separate property of Mrs. Poll. 
However, now he seeks before a court of equity to claim a one-half interest in the 
property." Id. 
It is apparent then, that the court did not rely on a finding that the statutory 
elements of a fraudulent transfer had occurred. Rather, this portion of the court's analysis 
relied on its application of the doctrine of unclean hands. Specifically, the court found 
that because Mr. Poll's intent was improper, he would not be heard to seek equitable 
relief. This is further evidenced by the trial court's citing to this Court's decision in 
Hone, 2004 UT App 241 for the proposition that a party that comes before a court of 
equity with unclean hands is not entitled to equitable relief. R. 336-35, ^ } 30-33. There 
is nothing new about the doctrine of unclean hands and the maxim that he who seeks 
equity must do equity. See e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Stiffler, 48 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1935) 
("A court of equity is a court of conscience, and anyone appealing to or asking the aid of 
such court should come into it with clean hands and be willing to do equity... Likewise, 
anyone who seeks equity must be willing to do equity") (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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The trial court's application of the doctrine of unclean hands squares perfectly 
with how it has always been applied. Shell Oil Co., 48 P.2d at 509. The critical finding 
for purposes of the trial court's unclean hands analysis is that Mr. Poll's intent at the time 
he conveyed his legal interest back to Ms. Straub was improper and, as such, he was 
found to have sought equitable relief with unclean hands. The trial court appropriately 
denied his request. R. 336, [^29; Hone, 2004 UT App at f 9. Mr. Poll's analysis of 
whether or not the statutory elements of a fraudulent transfer were met therefore not only 
misapprehends the trial court's analysis, it is a red herring. 
b. Mr. Poll's Attempt To Distinguish This Case From Hone Is Unavailing. 
Mr. Poll argues that the present case is distinguishable from Hone. His argument 
is that in Hone, one of the parties seeking equitable relief was found to have deceived 
Medicaid, while in the present case there was no creditor deceived by his transfer of the 
property back to Ms. Straub. Brief of Appellant at 40. This is a distinction without 
significance. The Hone court relied on the notion that a party seeking equitable relief 
must not come before a court of equity with unclean hands. Hone, 2004 UT App at f^ 7. 
Here, the trial court found that the transfer of the Wasatch Property out of Mr. 
Poll's hands was for an improper purpose. R. 335,133. It is of no moment that there 
was not a specifically identified creditor as there was in Hone. The critical question is 
whether the party seeking equity has done equity. Hone, 2004 UT App at % 7. Mr. Poll's 
attempt to distinguish these facts from the facts of Hone fails to identify a meaningful 
distinction between the two cases. In both cases, the trial court relied on the improper 
conduct of the party seeking equitable relief in denying such relief. This Court should 
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affirm the trial court's application of unclean hands just as it did in Hone. 
4. THE REMAINDER OF MR. POLL'S ANALYSIS AMOUNTS TO RE-
ARGUING FACTUAL THEORIES REJECTED BELOW IN THE HOPE 
THAT THIS COURT WILL RE-WEIGH THE EQUITIES AND FIND 
THEM IN HIS FAVOR. 
The remainder of Mr. Poll's analysis amounts to re-arguing his version facts in an 
attempt to get this Court to re-weigh the equities and make its own equitable division of 
the marital estate. Brief of Appellant at 47 ("James asks this Court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court, hold that the Wasatch County Property was marital property 
and hold that he is entitled to a one-half interest therein.55). By making this request, Mr. 
Poll asks this Court to usurp "the singularly important mission [of the trial court] to 
consider and weigh all the conflicting evidence and find the facts.55 Kimball 2009 UT 
App at Tf 20, FN 5. While there are rare circumstances where this Court can do so, Mr. 
Poll has not made a showing that any of those circumstances exist in this case. Rather, he 
argues that Ms. Straub5s conduct was more inequitable than Mr. Poll's,6 makes a public 
policy argument, and re-argues the equities in this case. 
Regarding the first argument that Ms. Straub5s conduct was more inequitable than 
Mr. Poll's because she knew that the purpose of the transfer was to shield the Wasatch 
Property from creditors, the trial court made a factual finding to the contrary that finds 
substantial support in the record. R. 337-36, fflf 26-29. The evidence cited by the trial 
Mr. Poll appears to have conceded that his conduct was inequitable in making one such 
argument: "Ms. Straub5s inequitable conduct, however, was more extensive than James 
because she was willing to defraud James as well.55 Brief of Appellant at 38. While Ms. 
Straub and the trial court both disagree with Mr. Poll's accusation against her, it does 
appear to be a tacit acknowledgment that his conduct was inequitable, which only 
bolsters the trial court's application of unclean hands. 
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court more than amply supports the finding, which is a sufficient basis for affirming. 
Kimball 2009 UT App at f 20, FN 5 ("No matter what contrary facts might have been 
found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial court's pre-eminent role as fact-
finder requires us to take the findings of fact as our starting point, unless particular 
findings have been shown, in the course of an appellant's meeting the marshalling 
requirement, to lack legally adequate evidentiary support."). Moreover, the critical 
inquiry here, as far as unclean hands is concerned, is not what Ms. Straub knew or did not 
know regarding Mr. Poll's intent in conveying the property back to her; the critical 
inquiry is Mr. Poll's intent at the time he conveyed the property back to her. See Hone, 
2004UTAppat1fll. 
Mr. Poll's public policy argument falls well wide of the mark. First, his 
hypothetical presented at page 41 is distinguishable from the present facts in one key 
regard. Mr. Poll raises the possibility of an unscrupulous spouse A convincing spouse B 
to transfer marital property to spouse A individually. Spouse A then files for divorce and 
claims that it was spouse B's intent to sequester the property from creditors. Spouse A 
then claims that spouse B had unclean hands and should be denied the opportunity to 
claim an equitable share of the property because of B's inequitable conduct. Brief of 
Appellant at 41. The problem with this hypothetical is that it does not mirror the facts 
here. Ms. Straub did nothing to convince Mr. Poll to convey his interest to the Wasatch 
Property, for which she paid $2.3 million, back to her. It was his idea. Brief of 
Appellant at 34-35; TR. 1 at 46:3-47:4; 99:13-100:7. The hypothetical is not helpful to 
the court because it is distinguishable. 
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But perhaps more glaring is that this Court need not be concerned with the policy 
implications of its decision in this case. If this Court affirms, the trial court's 
discretionary decision is not binding on any other trial court approaching an equitable 
division of a marital estate. Those trial courts will enjoy the same broad discretion in 
making property divisions as the equities of those cases require in the same way that the 
trial court enjoyed the same broad discretion to make such divisions as the equities in this 
case required. E.g., Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 273 (UT.Ct.App 1993). Further, 
district courts will enjoy even more flexibility in making factual findings in support of 
their equitable division. Kimball, 2004 UT App at \ 20, FN 5. The district court will be 
free to make factual findings so long as the findings are supported by the evidence, and 
weigh the equities of the case and divide marital estates as appropriate, as long as their 
division falls within their broad permissible discretion. Affirming the trial court here 
simply will not open the floodgates as Mr. Poll claims. Thus, Mr. Poll's public policy 
argument is unpersuasive because the decision of this case will not form binding 
precedent on trial courts of the state as Mr. Poll would have this Court believe it will. 
The only policy this Court should entertain is the long-standing policy that 
appellate courts of this state grant trial courts broad discretion in making such findings 
and equitable decisions. See id. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the 
credibility of all the conflicting evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, make factual 
findings on this evidence, weigh the equities and proceed accordingly. Id. This is 
particularly true where, as here, a substantial portion of the evidence on which the trial 
court relied comes in the form of live testimony, which is rife with non-verbal cues that 
21 
typically find no voice in the cold record. Appellate courts should not assume the role of 
a Monday morning quarterback in matters such as are involved in this appeal unless there 
is a compelling reason to do so. Such a compelling reason can be found only when an 
appellant has adequately marshaled the evidence and ferreted out a fatal flaw in the trial 
court's factual finding. Id. at f 21 (citing West Valley City 818 P.2d at 1315). Mr. Poll 
has failed to do so here. The policy of deference therefore requires affirming the trial 
court. 
Finally, Mr. Poll contends that there are no equitable grounds to justify denying 
him a share of the Wasatch Property. Brief of Appellant at 42-47. First, the primary 
grounds on which the trial court relied in denying him a share of the Wasatch Property 
was that the Wasatch Property is Ms. Straub's separate property. R. 337-35, fflf 24-29. 
That being the case, this argument is wide of the mark. The trial court found that Ms. 
Straub did not intend to make a gift of an interest in the Wasatch Property, which is to 
say that it remained her separate property. Even if this Court adopted wholesale Mr. 
Poll's view of the equities, he has no claim to her separate property. Hodge v. Hodge, 
2007 UT App 394,15, 174 P.3d 1137. 
Further, even if this Court were to look past this flaw, Mr. Poll's arguments must 
fail because he has not shown that the trial court has exceeded the bounds of its 
permissible discretion. His argument, summarized simply, is that the trial court should 
have given more weight to the evidence that favored Mr. Poll than it did. At no point 
does he even attempt to show how the trial court abused its discretion. Given the level of 
deference afforded trial courts in this posture, in the absence of even a facial attempt to 
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show that the trial court abused its discretion, it must be assumed that the trial court did 
not, and should therefore be affirmed. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, *{ 10. 
CONCLUSION 
Even if Mr. Poll has adequately surveyed the record for every scrap of evidence 
supporting the challenged finding, he has failed to ferret out a fatal flaw in the nexus 
between the supporting evidence and the finding he contests. Moreover, there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the contested finding. Additionally, the 
trial court specifically found Mr. Poll to be not credible on the pivotal issue here. His 
challenge must therefore fail. Simply re-arguing factual and equitable theories that were 
made to, and rejected by, the trial court does not justify reversing the trial court. 
Mr. Poll also misapprehends the trial court's application of the doctrine of unclean 
hands. The trial court's application of unclean hands was also proper, and provides this 
Court another basis on which it can rely in affirming the result below that Mr. Poll 
contests. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court should be affirmed. 
FfeaeuAfy 
Respectfully submitted on this, the */m day of-fanuary,2011. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
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